Capital Market Institutions and Venture Capital: Do They Affect Unemployment and Labour Demand? by Rainer Fehn & Thomas Fuchs
CAPITAL MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND VENTURE




CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 898
CATEGORY 5: FISCAL POLICY, MACROECONOMICS AND GROWTH
MARCH 2003
An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com
• from the CESifo website:           www.CESifo.deCESifo Working Paper No. 898
CAPITAL MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND
VENTURE CAPITAL: DO THEY AFFECT
UNEMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR DEMAND?
Abstract
This paper analyses the influence of the capital market on the labour market.
Especially the impact of start-up financing on the structure of unemployment is of
interest. We use a cross-country panel data analysis to examine how venture
capital investment influences disaggre-gate unemployment. As we expected,
venture capital investment has different influences on sectoral-, educational- and
occupational-specific unemployment. We suggest, on the basis of the regression
results that venture capital investment is a catalyst of structural change and has
contributed to the faster growing internet and new economy sector in countries
like the U.S. that have a well-developed venture capital market. 
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During the last twenty years the US has had an impressive labour market performance com-
pared with other developed economies like those of Continental Europe. A great part of this 
better performance can be attributed to US labour market institutions that can deal better with 
shocks and the structural change from a Tayloristic to a holistic organisation model. However, 
to fully explain the better performance of the US labour market, we must look at complemen-
tary markets that also influence the situation on the labour market. One possible market that 
influences the situation of the labour market is the financial market, as Schumpeter (1911) 
once emphasised. An obvious difference between the US and Continental Europe is the stock-
market-based capital market in the US and the bank-based capital market in continental 
Europe. This results in different financing possibilities for start-ups and expansion projects 
depending on the financial market type. In the US, venture capital (VC) financing is the 
dominant financing type for start-ups (Freear and Wetzel, 1990), whereas in Continental 
Europe debt financing is still the dominant financing type (Edwards and Fischer, 1994). From 
the 1950s to the 1980s the Continental European bank-based capital market seemed to work 
very well and was a comparative institutional advantage for these countries. But since the 
1990s some doubts have arisen inter alia because of the dominance of US companies in the 
Internet sector and the ability of the US to better adapt to the needs of the structural change 
and to benefit from it. One possible explanation for this development is the conjecture that a 
bank-based capital market is appropriate for a catching-up economy but not for developed 
countries operating at the innovative frontier (Carlin and Mayer, 1999, Acemoglu et al., 
2002).  
Therefore we conjecture that some of the structural problems of Continental European 
economies is the lacking market orientation of the bank-based Continental European capital 
markets which cannot deal as well as a stock-market-based capital market with the risk and 
uncertainty at the “innovative frontier”. A result of this effect should be that countries with 
bank-based capital markets have a comparative disadvantage in financing projects and start-
ups close to the innovative frontier. The evolution and development of new industries such as 
the new economy or biotech industry should therefore take place to a greater extent in stock-
market-based countries with well-functioning VC markets. Additionally we expect that the 
labour-saving technical progress that accompanies structural change will shift labour demand 
more in favour of high-skilled persons in stock-market-based countries compared to bank-
based countries. 
  1 This paper examines whether these conjectures indeed hold and whether there is some evi-
dence at the macroeconomic level for a relationship between the financial system of a coun-
try, especially the VC market as a financing tool for entrepreneurs, and the labour market per-
formance. For doing so, section 2 presents a theoretical model and derives the influence of 
different start-up financing types on the unemployment level. Section 3 presents a regression 
analysis which examines the influence of the capital and labour market on the unemployment 
rate over the post-war period. Section 4 presents the result of a cross country analysis examin-
ing the relationship between VC investment and the structure of unemployment. The last sec-
tion provides some concluding remarks based on our results. 
 
2. Capital Market Imperfections and Unemployment 
The theoretical model employed in this section has been developed by Wasmer and Weil 
(2000). This model relates the labour market performance to the situation on the financial 
market for entrepreneurs. It serves as a theoretical underpinning for the ensuing empirical 
analysis. The advantage of this model is that it also produces some macroeconomic predic-
tions concerning the relationship between the capital market and the labour market. These 
predictions are obtained by using the profit-maximising Bellman equations of each of the par-
ticipating market players. The model distinguishes three different groups of homogeneous 
actors: 
•  Entrepreneurs (F) who can set up a firm but have neither savings nor access to the capital 
market without a financial intermediary, 
•  Financiers, henceforth banks (B), who finance start-ups and act as financial intermediaries, 
and 
•  Workers who work in start-ups of entrepreneurs at a one-to-one ratio with entrepreneurs. 
The life cycle of a start-up has four phases: 
•  The search on the financial market with pecuniary costs k for the bank and non-pecuniary 
costs c for the entrepreneur. 
•  After a match on the financial market has occurred, the entrepreneur-bank partners search 
on the labour market a worker at a cost γ, which is borrowed from the bank. 
  2 •  After a successful search on the labour market, the start-up begins production. The profit of 
the start-up is shared according to negotiations between the entrepreneur and the bank. In-
deed, the profit sharing agreement is a kind of equity financing and no debt loan, although 
we speak of banks. 
•  The start-up will be liquidated with an exogenous probability of ρ. The involved entrepre-
neur, bank and worker each begin a new search on the relevant markets after the liquida-
tion of the firm. 
The situation on the financial market is characterised by the ratio of entrepreneurs and banks 
φ=F/B. This ratio determines the probability of a match between an entrepreneur and a bank, 
the duration of the search and hence the expected search cost for an entrepreneur or a bank. A 
higher value of φ accompanies higher expected search costs for entrepreneurs and lower ex-
pected search costs for banks. The ratio of entrepreneurs per bank is now higher, so that the 
existing entrepreneurs have a lower probability of finding a bank, whereas they have a higher 
probability of finding an entrepreneur and a project to finance. The situation on the labour 
market is characterised by the ratio of vacancies and unemployed workers θ=V/U. The num-
ber of vacancies is determined by the situation on the financial market and the probability for 
an entrepreneur-bank match. The ratio θ determines the probability of a match, the expected 
search duration for each party and hence the expected search cost for the entrepreneur-bank 
partnership. A higher value of θ means a lower probability for the entrepreneur-bank partner-
ship to find a worker and therefore increases the expected search cost for this party. In con-
trast, the expected search duration for the worker shortens because of the higher number of 
vacancies per unemployed worker. 



















Source: Wasmer and Weil (2000). 
In Figure 1 we depict the situation on the capital and labour market. Since the situation on the 
capital market determines the situation on the labour market, we only have to consider the 
behaviour and profit-maximising Bellman equations of the entrepreneurs and the banks and 
therefore their isoprofit curves EE and BB. These isoprofit curves include all points in φ,θ-
plane that have the same value. If there is perfect competition, i.e. no other alternatives for 
financing or for selling an idea for a start-up, the isoprofit curves are zero profit curves. Oth-
erwise the value of these curves would be equal to the non-negative value of available alterna-
tives.  
The isoprofit curve FF is downward sloped because a looser capital market for entrepreneurs 
must be compensated by a tighter situation on the labour market for firms. Beginning at point 
A, a tightening situation on the labour market leads to movement to point B, which is charac-
terised by a higher ratio of vacancies per unemployed worker. The expected search duration 
for the firm increases as well as the search costs. This cost increase must now be compensated 
by decreasing expected search costs for entrepreneurs on the capital market. Lower expected 
search costs lead to a shorter search duration for the entrepreneur and therefore a lower ratio 
  4 of entrepreneurs per bank, so that we move to point C, which lies on the same isoprofit curve 
as A. Similarly, the isoprofit curve BB is upward sloped because a looser capital market for 
banks must be compensated by a tighter labour market for firms. Beginning in point D, a 
tightening on the labour market for firms leads to higher expected search cost on the labour 
market and therefore to a move to point E, which is characterised by a higher ratio of vacan-
cies per unemployed worker. This cost increase of firms reduces the profit of banks via the 
profit sharing contract and is compensated by lower expected search costs for banks on the 
capital market. The search duration of banks decreases when the ratio of entrepreneurs per 
bank, and therefore φ, increases. This leads to a move from point E to F, which lies on the 
same isoprofit curve as point D. For given financing alternatives for banks and a market for 
selling start-up ideas, we will get two isoprofit curves whose value depends on the residual 
price on the shadow markets. The isoprofit curves will intersect at the equilibrium point G. G 
determines the equilibrium situation on the financial as well as the labour market. If we fix 
the number of workers and standardise it to one, we will get U as the share of unemployed 
workers and therefore as the unemployment rate. With no frictions on the capital market, we 
get the Pissarides’ (1990) equilibrium with θ=V/U and a deformed isoprofit curve for banks 
that shifts to the right. The deformed BB’ curve is inelastic for any changes of θ and identical 
with the θ-axis till θ
p . Then it is infinitely elastic for a change of θ. 
In the next step, we implement the consequences of some empirical facts about venture capi-
tal investment compared with debt loan financing in our model. We use this comparison to 
derive theoretically a comparative advantage of stock-market-based capital markets to bank-
based capital markets under certain circumstances.  
First of all, there is a broad literature which derives a comparative advantage of venture-
capital-backed companies with respect to their growth rates (see, for instance, Lerner, 1996). 
A possible reason for this advantage could be the fact that venture-backed companies are 
more innovative than non-venture backed companies (Kortum and Lerner, 1998). Although 
Engel and Keilbach deny this for Germany (Engel and Keilbach, 2002), Engel (2001) derives 
a higher growth rate of venture capital backed companies in Germany that could be attributed 
to the superior managerial advice of VC companies (Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2000). Another 
positive aspect of the managerial advice of VC companies is the higher survival rate of ven-
ture-capital-backed start-ups (Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2000). The advice of VC companies 
should help start-ups avoid making managerial mistakes that could threaten their existence.  























Source: Wasmer and Weil (2000). 
Both effects, the higher growth rate and the higher survival rate, lead to higher expected prof-
its of start-ups. In Figure 2 we depict the consequences of higher profits on the equilibrium 
situation. The higher expected profits result from an improved return situation and shift the 
FF curve to the right to FF’. A higher expected profit attracts more entrepreneurs. If we take 
point H and hold the number of banks constant, a higher number of entrepreneurs will lead to 
an increase of φ and to a shift of the FF curve to the point I. The new isoprofit curve of the 
entrepreneurs is FF’, which lies to the right of FF. The point of intersection of the FF’ curve 
and the θ-axis is the Pissarides’ equilibrium without credit market frictions θ
pp. θ
pp has shifted 
to the right because of the improved return situation, a higher marginal product of labour and 
hence a higher labour demand because of a fixed exogenous wage rate. The BB curve shifts, 
because of the improved earnings situation, to the right. Improved profits attract more banks, 
which is why the BB curve shifts from point J to point K. The higher number of banks lowers 
φ because of  a constant number of entrepreneurs. The new BB’’ curve lies to right of BB. 
The new equilibrium with capital and labour market frictions is in point L with φ
* (the capital 
  6 market equilibrium does not depend on the earnings) and θ
**. The new labour market equilib-
rium θ
** implies a lower unemployment rate.
1 
In the next step we discuss how far VC financing has a comparative advantage over credit 
financing with regard to costs. A possible cost advantage could result from the superior in-
formation basis of a VC company. VC companies advise start-ups and monitor them more 
closely than creditors. This managerial support of start-ups allows the VC company to gain 
some information about which skills are important for the success of a start-up and how best 
to evaluate these skills. A creditor who is not involved in the operation of his client does not 
have the possibility of gaining this information. This would now enable the VC company to 
focus its screening activity on the relevant factors and therefore to lower screening costs. An-
other effect could be that the VC company can preselect the group of entrepreneurs because of 
some special skills of the entrepreneur before the screening procedure. The remaining screen-
ing group would be of a higher quality. This possible performance improvement should be 
attributed to the screening procedure and therefore be a cost improvement because the overall 
earnings of a firm do not change. Only the expected profit of the capital provider increases 
due to the preselection process during which the most promising entrepreneurs are picked out 
of the overall group of entrepreneurs.  
The symmetrical risk sharing and success participation of VC companies and their start-ups 
without an upper limit could be also a possible cost advantage of VC companies. Ordinary 
credit financing does not benefit from firm’s success once it exceeds the loan value. Contrar-
ily, a VC company benefits from the additional value created. As long as the survival rate of 
start-ups is high, the asymmetric risk sharing does not lead to a severe disadvantage of credit 
financing. The stable, long-term relationship between the creditor and its debtor could even be 
a comparative advantage (Allen and Gale, 1999). This comparative advantage of credit fi-
nancing to equity financing disappears with the development of an economy (Boyd and 
Smith, 1998, Acemoglu et al., 2002) and becomes even a disadvantage when the projects are 
R&D intense with more uncertain future prospects (Huang and Xu, 1999)
2. Because of this 
disadvantage of credit financing in funding innovation-based projects, the creditor has to 
charge a higher risk premium and therefore higher capital costs than a VC company. The non-
fixed payment obligations of the entrepreneur additionally reduce the risk incentive problem 
of debt financing and create a comparative advantage of VC financing. A costly monitoring of 
                                            
1 An analytical proof is given by Wasmer and Weil (2000), p.16. 
2 We assume hereby that market based systems go along with a lower bank concentration. 
  7 the entrepreneur to avoid a misallocation of funds in too risky projects is, in contrast to credit 
financing, not necessary or only to a lower degree, and so the costs of a VC company de-
crease.  





















Source: Wasmer and Weil (2000). 
The consequences of the above derived results are depicted in Figure 3. The costs of a VC 
company compared to a creditor would be reduced and the BB curve would be shifted from 
point M to point N. For a given number of entrepreneurs, there will be more banks, φ de-
creases and BB shifts to the right to B
+. In the new equilibrium point O, φ decreases and θ 
increases, so that the unemployment rate is reduced due to the larger value θ
+, which is ac-
companied by a reduced unemployment rate. 
In the next two sections we test the above derived results for their empirical relevance. Before 
we examine the influence of venture capital financing on the unemployment rate in Chapter 4, 
we examine the influence of the institutional setting on the capital market on the unemploy-
ment rate over a 40 year period.   
 
  8 3. Long-Term Influence of Capital Markets 
Depending on the development stage of an economy, different kinds of capital markets should 
have a comparative institutional advantage. We expect bank-based capital markets to be ad-
vantageous for the duration of the catching-up process. Imitative investments in already avail-
able technologies should impose lower monitoring costs for banks, so that bank-based capital 
markets foster the growth of investment-based industries. In contrast, stock-market-based 
capital markets should have a comparative advantage in funding innovation-based projects at 
a later stage of economic development (Boyd and Smith, 1998, Acemoglu et al., 2002). Due 
to the fact that capital markets are related to the legal origin of a country, a switch from one 
system to another is not easily and quickly possible but rather requires a substantial transition 
period (La Porta et al., 1998). We therefore examine the extent to which the legal origin of a 
country has been advantageous for a country and whether there has been a breaking point of 
the influence when a country has finished its catching-up process and operates close to the 
innovative frontier. For this purpose we use a data set of developed countries employed by 
Blanchard and Wolfers (1999), which is supplemented by some additional data of financial 
markets taken from La Porta et al. (1998) and the OECD (Leahy et al., 2001). The data set 
consists of eight five-year periods, beginning in 1960 and ending in 1999. 
The regression method implied is a FGLS estimation with a White HCCM. The estimation 





tj ijt t it e h g f Z b X D c u + + + + + = ∑ ∑ ,                                 (1) 
whereby uit is the average unemployment rate during the five year period. C is a constant term 
and Dt is a matrix of time dummy vectors which tests for an increase of the unemployment 
rate over time. Xijt is the value of the country-specific value of the labour market institution j 
in country i for the period t. Zim is the value of the country-specific institutional setting of the 
labour market for country i. It consists of a dummy variable for the legal origin as well as the 
values for creditor and shareholder rights in a country. The capital market matrix Zim is time 
invariant because of the above-mentioned, very long transition period of a capital market set-
ting. git is the average annual growth rate of the GDP of country i for period t and shall con-
trol for cyclical effects on the unemployment rate. 
The exogenous regression variables are the following
3:  
                                            
3 They are explained in detail in the appendix. 
  9 o  Labour market institutions  
o  Active Labour Market Expenditures as percentage of GDP (ALMPHAT), 
o  Benefit Duration (BENEFIT), 
o  Replacement Rate (RR), 
o  Union Density (UDEN), the co-ordination level of contract negotiation (CO-
ORD), 
o  Employment Protection (EMPRO), 
o  Tax Wedge (WEDGE) and 
o  Union Contract Coverage (UNION), 
o  Capital market settings: 
o  Three country dummies for legal origin relative to common law,  
  German law origin (GERMAN), 
  French law origin (FRENCH) and 
  Scandinavian law origin (SCAND), 
o  creditor rights and 
o  shareholder rights. 
All variables are standardised in a way that a higher value corresponds with a more generous 
setting of the institution. 
Table 1: Influence of the legal origin on the unemployment rate 











SHARE 0.006598 0.1101 0.003627 0.1084 0.002011 0.7617
CREDIT -0.004505 0.0995 -0.005412 0.0074 -0.005553 0.321
GERMAN -0.027204 0.139 -0.03545 0.0026 -0.081035 0.1142
FRENCH -0.018618 0.2566 -0.032993 0.0075 -0.067504 0.1036
SCAND -0.012696 0.5576 -0.042353 0.0032 -0.021858 0.6901
 
In Table 1 we present the estimation results for the capital market settings for different time 
periods. Due to the fact that the influence of the capital market on the unemployment rate is of 
special interest, we refer to the appendix for the estimation results of all variables implied. 
The legal origin of a country is used in this regression to distinguish between a bank-based 
and a stock-market-based capital market. Countries with German, Scandinavian and French 
  10 legal origins have a bank-based capital market, whereas the reference group (common law 
origin) has a stock-market-based capital market. For the whole period from 1960 to 1999 the 
legal origin had no statistically significant influence
4 on the unemployment rate. But when we 
consider only the period from 1960 to 1980, we get the result that the Continental European 
countries had a statistically significant (at least countries with Scandinavian and German legal 
origin) lower expected unemployment rate for the period from 1960 to 1980, which we inter-
pret as an indication for a comparative institutional advantage of bank-based capital markets 
over this time period. The bank-based capital markets of those countries seemed to help the 
continental European countries in their catching-up process after World War II and reduced 
the unemployment rate of these countries relative to the common law countries.  
The different development stages of economies are considered in this regression by including 
the average real GDP growth rate, so that this effect cannot be the cause for country differ-
ences of the unemployment rate, as well as the labour market setting which is also included in 
this regression. In a second step, we run a regression for the 1985-1999 period to check 
whether a comparative institutional advantage of German and Scandinavian law countries still 
exists. For this period we get a positive statistically significant influence of the dummy vari-
able for German and Scandinavian Law countries, which is consistent with our conjecture that 
the comparative advantage of the capital market setting of these countries has disappeared and 
has even become a comparative disadvantage with the approach to the innovative frontier. 
The influence of the French law country dummy is still statistically insignificant and has not 
changed its sign, so that we can not conclude that the institutional setting of French law coun-
tries has become disadvantageous. To further investigate the influence of the capital market 
on the labour market after 1985, we examine in the next section the influence of venture capi-
tal financing on the disaggregate structure of the unemployment level, because this financing 
tool is of special interest for start-ups and for fostering the process of structural change. 
 
4. Influence of VC-Investment on the Structure of Labour Demand 
As mentioned in Section 2, there are some facts that suggest that VC financing has a com-
parative advantage in financing innovation-based projects compared to ordinary debt financ-
ing. If this conjecture is true, we would expect that the labour demand for innovation-based 
industries will be higher in countries with a better functioning venture capital market. To test 
                                            
4 We test for a significance level of 5%. 
  11 for the validity of this conjecture, we make three separate FGLS estimations that examine the 
influence of venture capital investment
5 and of early stage investment
6 on the change of the 
unemployment level according to industry classification, occupation and educational attain-
ment. For this purpose we use a data set
7 of 20 developed countries for a 14 year period from 
1986 to 1999. Unfortunately, we did not have the disaggregate unemployment data before 
1992, so that we use VC investment as a lagged variable for a seven year period to observe 
the long term influence on the unemployment rate. The advantage of such a method is that we 
do not place on the VC investment any restrictions on the expected influence, as some dy-
namical estimation equations with lagged dependent variables do. We were in addition 
thereby able to avoid severe autocorrelation problems occurring in estimation equations with 
lagged dependent variables (Belke, Fehn and Foster, 2002). The estimation implied is a FGLS 
estimation with a White HCCM and the following equation: 
∆uit= α + β VCit-k+ γ∆GDPit-l+δjXjit+ εit,                            (2) 
whereby ∆uit is the standardised change of the unemployment level, α is a constant term with 
common effects. VCit-k is the VC investment level relative to GDP for t to t-7 and Xjit are the 
labour market institutional settings which should test for different changes of unemployment 
with respect to different labour market settings. ∆GDPit is the real GDP growth rate and εit is a 
country specific error term. We additionally include a trend variable because of the measure-
ment of the unemployment variable as a level variable and possibly occurring demographic 
effects. We use the above-mentioned estimation specification because we expect that the VC 
investment level and the real GDP growth rate affect the change of the unemployment level. 
Country-specific level differences of the unemployment level should be removed by using the 
standardised change of the unemployment level. The influence of a changing institutional 
setting on the labour market is considered by the country specific labour market variables 
which are measured by their level rather than by their change due to low variation over time. 
We additionally use the level of labour market institutions because the level of these institu-
tions and their values influence the change of the unemployment level. 
                                            
5 Including seed, start-up and expansion investment. 
6 Including seed and start-up investment. 
7 The data set implied uses for the change of the unemployment level data from the online database of the ILO 
and from the European social statistics. The VC investment data is taken from Belke, Fehn and Foster (2002) 
as well as the real GDP growth rate and the labour market institutional settings. The data sources are explained 
in detail in the appendix. 
  12 As the first of three regressions, we present the results of the estimation for the influence of 
VC and early stage investment on the change of the unemployment level according to indus-
try specification. We expect that those industries that are innovation-based should benefit 
most from VC investment and early stage investment. Due to the fact that start-ups should be 
more financially constrained in financing innovation-based projects than already existing 
firms which have a significant amount of free cash flows or other inventories of significant 
value (Hubbard, 1997), early stage investment should have a substantial effect on unemploy-
ment. Especially innovative, high-tech industries like the telecom sector or new economy 
should be the beneficiaries of higher investment levels. 





































VC investment at a signifi-
cance level of  1%
0.210 0.469 0.000 -0.164 0.014 0.000 -0.239 -0.023 0.084
Cumulative influence of
early stage investment at a
significance level of 1% 1.264 0.147 -0.267 1.063 0.528 0.000 0.000 0.090 0.501
 
In Table 2 we present the regression results for the influence on the change of the unemploy-
ment level according to industry classification. We focus on the cumulative influence of VC 
and start-up investment on the change of the unemployment level at a significance level of 
1%
8. Early stage investment has a negative influence on the unemployment level for the 
manufacturing sector. A possible explanation for this fact is that VC has backed start up pro-
jects that could not have been realised with ordinary credit financing. Especially the invest-
ment-intensive manufacturing sector seems to need early stage financing to fund projects in a 
more volatile economic environment. Contrary to expectations, the influence of early stage 
investment is insignificant for the traffic and telecom sector. A reason for this could be that 
only after a long period does investment in start-ups create a perceptible positive influence on 
the labour market, which is not observed in the short and mid-term (here, seven years). The 
other industrial sectors are losers of early stage investment, which is not surprising because 
these sectors do not benefit from structural change. When we examine the influence of VC 
                                            
8 For a detailed estimation output we refer to the appendix. 
  13 investment, we observe that it has a negative influence on the unemployment level of the tele-
com sector, financial services and the electricity sector. VC investment has the expected effect 
on the unemployment level of the telecom sector and creates a significant amount of addi-
tional labour demand in contrast to early stage investment. The same is true for the financial 
services sector. The old economy sectors are disadvantaged by accelerated structural change 
and experience higher unemployment levels. 
In the next step, we examine the influence of VC and early stage on the unemployment level 
according to occupation. We suggest that the beneficiaries of VC and early stage investment 
should be the high-skilled persons, because they profit most from a labour saving structural 
change (Berthold, 2000). Among the groups of engineers, scientists and managers, the high-
skilled persons should be represented to a considerable degree so that we expect that these 
groups benefit most from a higher investment level.  





























Cumulative influence of VC
investment at a significance level
of 1%
0.089 -0.088 -0.183 0.000 0.000 -0.012 0.109
Cumulative influence of early
stage investment at a significance
level of 1%
0.317 1.348 -0.353 -0.461 -0.090 0.578 0.435
 
The regression results in Table 3 show the influence of VC and early stage investment on the 
change of the unemployment level at a significance level of 1%. The results of early stage 
investment are consistent for the group of engineers with the conjectures mentioned above. 
The influence on the unemployment level of the group of managers and scientists is positive 
and inconsistent with our expectations. A possible explanation could be that a higher rate of 
early stage investment induces the existing companies to reduce their managerial and R&D 
staff, and therefore labour demand decreases for these two groups. This lower labour demand 
cannot be compensated by the additional labour demand of start-ups in the short and mid-term 
because these companies do usually not have an R&D department or a complex managerial 
system at the beginning of their life cycle so that the overall unemployment level increases. A 
higher early stage investment level decreases the unemployment level of office workers which 
  14 indicates that this group of workers is complementary to entrepreneurs. The other groups of 
workers do not benefit from early stage investment, which is not surprising when we take into 
account that these groups consist mainly of low-skilled people that should be at a disadvan-
tage in structural change that is accelerated by early stage investment. The regression results 
concerning the influence of the VC investment level on the unemployment rate are consistent 
with the conjectures above for the groups of scientists and engineers. Only the influence on 
the unemployment level of managers contradicts our expectations. Smaller administrative 
departments and hence a higher unemployment level of managers could be an effect of an 
active participation and monitoring of VC companies that avoid a too complex administration. 
The influence on the unemployment rate on skilled workers is also negative, which indicates 
that not only high-skilled workers with a university degree benefit from an accelerated struc-
tural change but also skilled workers. The influence on the other occupational groups are ei-
ther insignificant or increase the unemployment level which is consistent with our expecta-
tions. 
In the third regression we estimated the influence of VC and early investment on the change 
of the unemployment level according to educational attainment. This is the core of our hy-
pothesis concerning the effect of VC investment on structural change. We suggest that VC 
and early stage investment should reduce unemployment among high-skilled workers and 
increase unemployment among low-skilled workers. VC investment should enhance structural 
change and the accompanying labour saving technical progress. This would reduce labour 
demand of low-skilled workers and hence increase the unemployment level. Simultaneously 
labour demand for high-skilled workers should grow and the unemployment level of this 
group should decrease because of VC investment.  







Cumulative influence of VC investment at a significance
level of 1%
0.142 -0.325
Cumulative influence of early stage investment at a sig-
nificance level of 1%
0.000 -1.066
 
  15 The results in Table 4 confirm these hypotheses concerning the effect VC investment on the 
structure of labour demand according to educational attainment. Early stage investment does 
not affect the unemployment level of low-skilled workers but has a significant negative influ-
ence on the unemployment level of high-skilled workers. Compared to VC investment, the 
influence of early stage investment is three times larger on the unemployment rate so that 
early stage investment can be regarded as a better tool to promote structural change. But nev-
ertheless does VC investment also act a catalyst for structural change and the implied labour 
saving technical progress with adverse effects on labour demand for low-skilled workers and 
positive effects on labour demand for high-skilled workers. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The regression results of the long term influence of the capital market indicate that there has 
been a structural break in the influence of the institutional setting on the capital market on the 
labour market. We suggest that this structural break is caused by different stages of economic 
development and a changing comparative institutional advantage concerning the appropriate-
ness of capital markets in funding innovation-based or investment-based projects. The regres-
sion results of the disaggregate unemployment estimations give clear evidence that VC in-
vestment and early stage investment have effects on the structure of labour demand and hence 
on unemployment. Although we get different results for the influence of VC and early stage 
investment on the unemployment level according to industry classification, probably because 
of a too aggregate distinction between industry sectors, we can conclude, because of the re-
sults of the influence of VC and early stage investment on the unemployment level according 
to occupation, that there are different effects on the structure of labour demand. Groups with 
high-skilled people seem to benefit from VC investment and at least one of these groups from 
early stage investment. Other groups do not benefit from VC and early stage investment ex-
cept the group of office workers and skilled workers. The last regression, which distinguishes 
explicitly between high-skilled workers and low-skilled workers, substantiates our hypothesis 
that high-skilled workers benefit most from VC and early stage investment activity. These 
results confirm the suggestion that VC and early stage investment acts as catalysts of struc-
tural change.  
In order to benefit from the job creation side of VC investment, policy makers should try, 
irrespective of the legal origin of their capital markets, to implement a market for VC financ-
ing especially when we consider the problems of current debt financing. A possible way to 
  16 improve the efficiency and liquidity of the VC market is the establishment of pension funds as 
VC providers which could be achieved by switching to a significant extent from pay-as-you-
go to funded pension systems. Another focus should lie on the improvement of existing IPO 
markets as exit channels for VC providers. Especially better accounting standards and an im-
proved corporate governance system are necessary to create transparency and trust after nu-
merous accounting scandals like Enron. The liquidity and efficiency of a secondary stock 
market is crucial for the efficiency of a VC market so that policy makers should focus on the 
revival of stock markets segments like the NASDAQ or the German “Neuer Markt”. 
Nevertheless, it is also essential that labour market and welfare state reforms along with re-
forms of the education sector are undertaken by policy makers. Workers have only two possi-
bilities to react to the challenge created by structural change: They can either become better or 
cheaper. A welfare state should therefore not obstruct workers from qualifying and from 
switching their occupation or industry sector by setting a reservation wage which is too high. 
Generous welfare payments should be reconsidered and cut back, if they are not incentive 
compatible. Wage negotiations should be decentralised so that they do not hinder workers 
from negotiating wages which are in line with the economic situation at the firm level and so 
that they do not prevent the establishment of a low wage sector. Tax credit systems like the 
EITC in the US can help to absorb the adverse income effects on low-skilled workers of such 
reforms and provide incentives for work and qualification on the job. Qualification on the job 
is usually more effective in this respect than active labour market programs which often ig-
nore market needs and foster long term unemployment via carrousel effects.  
Policy makers should concentrate government activities and expenditure on improving work 
incentives and possibilities to qualify. Improving the education system inter alia via reducing 
its underfunding in many European countries and via strengthening the incentives to perform 
well for teachers and professors are key issues in this respect. Furthermore, a general and per-
ceptible tax rate decrease and a cutback of progressive income taxation would strengthen in-
centives to build up human capital and would foster entrepreneurial dynamism due to higher 
after tax income and profits.  
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Table 5: Explanation of classification by sectors, occupation and educational attainment 




ISCI-4  Electricity, gas, water 
ISCI-5 Construction 
ISCI-6  Retail and food 
ISCI-7 Traffic,  telecommunication 
ISCI-8 Financial  services 
ISCI-9  Public administration, others 




ISCO-4 Office  workers 
ISCO-5 Service  personnel 
ISCO-6  Skilled workers, farmers 
ISCO-7  Unskilled workers, others 
Classification by educational attainment 
ISCED-1  Lower than university degree 
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Table 6: Description of the labour market and capital market variables 
 
Macroeconomic time series 
Average real GDP change (Growth)  Source:  Blanchard  and  Wolfers,  1999, 
Data and Appendix. 
Real gross domestic product (GDP)    Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators 
Employment by occupation (EISCO)  Source: ILO Web Database and European 
social statistics, several volumes, 1993-
1999. 
Employment by industry sector (EISCI)
  
Source: ILO Web Database and European 
social statistics, several volumes, 1993-
1999. 
Unemployment by occupation (UISCO)
  
Source: ILO Web Database and European 
social statistics, several volumes, 1993-
1999. 
Unemployment by industry sector (UISCI)  Source: ILO Web Database and European 
social statistics, several volumes, 1993-
1999. 
Unemployment by educational attainment 
(UISCED) 
Source: ILO Web Database. 
Institutional labour market variables   
Benefit replacement ratio  (RR1) Average replacement rate over the 
first year of an unemployment spell. 
Source: Blanchard and Wolfers (1999), pp. 
11 ff. and data appendix. Three realisations 
per country (for 1986-89, 1990-94 and 
1995-99). Indicator displays more variabil-
ity than RRATE. 
Benefit duration (BENEFIT)  Duration of unemployment benefits (years, 
4 years meaning indefinite). Source: 
Layard and Nickell (1997), pp. 11 ff., and 
complementary data delivered by S. Nick-
ell. 
Union coordination index (UNCORD)
  
Union co-ordination in wage bargaining. 
Index with 3 = high, 2 =middle, 1 = low. 
Source: Layard and Nickell (1997), Table 
3, and complementary data delivered by S. 
Nickell. 
Employment protection index (EMPRO)
  
Country ranking with 20 as the most 
strictly regulated. Source: Layard and 
  21 Nickell (1997), p. 6, Table 2, and comple-
mentary data delivered by S. Nickell. 
Tax wedge (T)    Total tax wedge (in %). Sum of the payroll 
tax rate, the income tax rate and the con-
sumption tax rate. Average rates derived 
from national income and tax data. Source: 
Layard and Nickell (1997), p.4, Table 1, 
and complementary data delivered by S. 
Nickell. 
Venture capital investment time series   
Venture capital investment (VC)    Seed, start-up and expansion (both gov-
ernment and private sector funded) as per 
mil of average GDP. Source: Data calcu-
lated from Asian Venture Capital Journal 
(2000), Baygan, Freudenberg (2000), 
European Venture Capital Association 
(2000), National Venture Capital Associa-
tion (2000), Jeng, Wells (2000) 
Early stage venture capital investment 
(INVEARLY) 
Seed and startup (both government and 
private sector funded) as per mil of average 
GDP. Source: Data calculated from Asian 
Venture Capital Journal (2000), Baygan, 
Freudenberg (2000), European Venture 
Capital Association (2000), National Ven-
ture Capital Association (2000), Jeng, 
Wells (2000) 
Institutional capital market variables   
Creditor rights (CREDITRIGHT)    Index  of the legal systems protection of 
creditors in case of a firm’s liqidation or 
reorganization. Range: 0 to 4, 4 is the 
highest level of creditor protection. Source: 
La Porta et al. (1998), p. 1136, Table 4. 
Legal Origin (GERMAN, FRENCH, 
SCAND) 
Dummy for German, French or Scandina-
vian Legal origin, Source: La porta et. al, 
1998, Table 3. 
Creditor  rights  OECD  (CREDIT)  Measure of creditor rights with a mean 
value of 0 and a standard deviation of 
1,Source: Leahy et al, p.37. 
Shareholder rights (SHARE)  Measure of shareholder rights with a mean 
value of 0 and a standard deviation of 
1,Source: Leahy et al, p.37. 
  22   Table 7: Estimation Output - Dependent Variable: Unemployment rate
9 
Time period           1960-1999 1960-1979 1985-1999
Variable              Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob.
ALMPHAT              0.00126 0.0001 0.001028 0.0015 0.001423 0.0067
BENEFIT              0.00179 0.566 -0.007199 0.0236 0.011217 0.0335
COORD              0.02223 0.0001 0.002588 0.5193 0.033104 0.0003
UNION              0.014838 0.1146 0.012026 0.1912 0.008494 0.5197
UDEN              0.000585 0.0404 0.000594 0.0145 0.000578 0.2059
RRATE              0.000793 0.0008 0.000543 0.0137 0.000835 0.0328
T              0.001243 0.0003 0.001309 0.0007 0.001394 0.0122
EMPRO              0.003111 0.0057 0.000128 0.8837 0.004687 0.0009
GROWTH              -0.287973 0.1614 0.065438 0.7431 -0.192505 0.4962
SHARE              0.005573 0.2139 0.005032 0.1627 0.009288 0.1515
CREDIT              -0.000238 0.9414 -0.00456 0.0906 0.000369 0.957
GERMAN              -0.017953 0.3225 -0.034477 0.0101 0.005627 0.8447
FRENCH              -0.023386 0.181 -0.021405 0.1344 -0.00373 0.8904
SCAND              -0.007404 0.7435 -0.059798 0.002 0.045268 0.1734
                                            
9 The influence of constant terms and dummies for time periods are not depicted. 
 Table 8: Estimation Output - Dependent Variable: change of the unemployment level according to occupation 
                      ISCO1 ISCO2  ISCO3  ISCO4 ISCO5 ISCO6 ISCO7
INVEARLY                              0.0331 0.6314 0.1719 0.0045 0.0469 0.2495 -0.0157 0.8552 0.0046 0.9116 0.0681 0.0058 -0.0114 0.7646
INVEARLY(-1)                              0.3173 0.0402 -0.3998 0.0037 -0.1185 0.2497 0.1746 0.3010 0.1536 0.0630 -0.0535 0.4160 0.3770 0.0000
INVEARLY(-2)                              -0.0949 0.5844 0.0356 0.8155 0.3419 0.0126 0.2506 0.3485 0.3068 0.0066 0.1320 0.1522 -0.3510 0.0043
INVEARLY(-3)                              -0.2838 0.2543 0.1827 0.3664 0.2180 0.2701 0.0070 0.9770 -0.3617 0.0785 -0.0582 0.6856 0.4093 0.0115
INVEARLY(-4)                              0.1557 0.6716 -0.4781 0.1711 -0.2105 0.4778 0.1643 0.5468 -0.2504 0.3095 0.2022 0.3028 -0.0909 0.7137
INVEARLY(-5)                              0.1482 0.6799 0.8753 0.0226 -0.1769 0.4787 -0.4615 0.0446 0.3154 0.0939 -0.1431 0.3417 -0.1367 0.5901
INVEARLY(-6)                              0.1845 0.4510 0.7004 0.0300 0.3563 0.1592 -0.0310 0.9005 0.2773 0.1564 0.5102 0.0022 -0.1668 0.3780
INVEARLY(-7)                              0.0921 0.6630 -0.2152 0.3839 -0.6951 0.0027 -0.0633 0.7291 -0.3970 0.0120 -0.2734 0.0839 -0.1975 0.2180
C                              0.1061 0.5240 0.0568 0.8711 0.4267 0.0112 0.0286 0.9602 0.2953 0.0031 0.2367 0.2511 0.2596 0.0162
RR1                              -0.0041 0.0028 -0.0009 0.5940 0.0027 0.0962 -0.0011 0.6258 -0.0004 0.8023 0.0001 0.9346 0.0000 0.9820
RR25                              -0.0033 0.0206 -0.0032 0.2745 -0.0043 0.0016 -0.0024 0.6436 -0.0034 0.0032 -0.0021 0.4041 -0.0004 0.7345
RRATE                              0.0034 0.1063 0.0069 0.0447 -0.0023 0.4184 -0.0007 0.6994 -0.0003 0.8559 0.0016 0.4862 -0.0027 0.0905
BENEFIT                              0.0068 0.7553 -0.0425 0.1548 0.0340 0.1383 0.0527 0.1504 0.0242 0.1760 -0.0171 0.5863 0.0552 0.0041
UNCORD                              0.0704 0.2709 -0.1101 0.3348 0.0989 0.1785 0.1359 0.0013 0.0819 0.1234 0.0047 0.9283 0.1114 0.0230
NEWEP                              0.0241 0.7234 0.1156 0.2402 -0.0856 0.2421 -0.0384 0.3102 -0.0144 0.6110 -0.0384 0.5986 -0.0059 0.8610
T                              0.0013 0.4974 -0.0060 0.1639 -0.0004 0.8327 0.0039 0.7524 -0.0012 0.3366 -0.0017 0.3044 -0.0022 0.2345
CREDITRIGHT                              -0.0046 0.8338 0.0526 0.0618 0.0300 0.1505 -0.0291 0.5205 0.0031 0.8634 0.0382 0.2787 -0.0438 0.0428
SHARERIGHT                              -0.0135 0.6586 -0.0219 0.6098 -0.0414 0.1020 0.0077 0.8402 -0.0130 0.2340 -0.0463 0.1710 0.0206 0.2178
D(GDPR)                              0.0153 0.0306 0.0225 0.0048 0.0087 0.3014 -0.0019 0.8330 0.0016 0.8546 0.0089 0.3032 -0.0328 0.0000
D(GDPR(-1))                              -0.0159 0.0213 -0.0118 0.0677 -0.0128 0.0327 -0.0168 0.0066 -0.0079 0.0874 0.0021 0.7622 -0.0121 0.1220
TREND                              -0.0329 0.0021 -0.0103 0.5066 -0.0376 0.0008 -0.0350 0.0000 -0.0307 0.0000 -0.0163 0.0387 -0.0216 0.0346
R-squared                       0.4835 0.4225 0.4959 0.5214 0.7571 0.3689 0.7166
Durbin-Watson                       2.4974 2.0300 2.4458 1.9157 1.7821 2.4140 1.9389
                
 Table 9: Estimation Output - Dependent Variable: change of the unemployment level according to occupation 
                       ISCO1 ISCO2 ISCO3 ISCO4 ISCO5 ISCO6 ISCO7
VC                              -0.0061 0.6896 0.0638 0.0150 0.0055 0.6855 -0.0040 0.8270 -0.0184 0.1902 0.0143 0.1015 -0.0068 0.6476
VC(-1)                              0.1476 0.0000 -0.0111 0.7827 0.0590 0.1445 0.0267 0.5454 0.0602 0.1866 0.0623 0.0030 0.1089 0.0089
VC(-2)                              -0.0419 0.0763 0.0444 0.4869 0.0507 0.3271 0.0965 0.1090 0.0757 0.1530 0.0787 0.0045 -0.0009 0.9814
VC(-3)                              -0.0876 0.0023 0.0559 0.1155 -0.0901 0.0749 -0.0472 0.2520 -0.0557 0.3274 -0.1533 0.0000 -0.0379 0.4881
VC(-4)                              0.1758 0.0000 0.0093 0.8682 0.1633 0.0008 0.0195 0.6549 -0.0472 0.2338 0.0560 0.0338 0.0023 0.9656
VC(-5)                              -0.1469 0.0000 -0.2923 0.0000 -0.1820 0.0017 -0.1240 0.0207 -0.0663 0.0809 0.0318 0.2343 -0.0428 0.4205
VC(-6)                              0.0248 0.5359 0.2048 0.0000 0.0517 0.3694 0.0280 0.3822 0.0584 0.2297 0.0481 0.0458 -0.0506 0.4858
VC(-7)                              -0.0518 0.1641 -0.0517 0.2413 -0.1640 0.0030 0.0123 0.6630 -0.0313 0.3505 0.0492 0.0199 -0.0709 0.1486
C                              0.1889 0.1405 0.1467 0.6338 0.4316 0.0024 0.0465 0.9399 0.2340 0.0233 0.1890 0.1871 0.2817 0.0197
RR1                              -0.0031 0.0012 0.0006 0.6318 0.0027 0.0253 -0.0007 0.6800 -0.0002 0.8777 0.0012 0.3124 0.0007 0.5163
RR25                              -0.0034 0.0028 -0.0015 0.5958 -0.0057 0.0001 -0.0032 0.5545 -0.0034 0.0566 -0.0028 0.2758 -0.0032 0.0780
RRATE                              0.0032 0.0907 0.0043 0.1191 -0.0025 0.3281 0.0012 0.5123 -0.0003 0.8677 0.0014 0.4625 -0.0026 0.1232
BENEFIT                              0.0157 0.5057 -0.0050 0.8901 0.0381 0.0551 0.0249 0.4385 0.0250 0.2357 -0.0104 0.7299 0.0593 0.0062
UNCORD                              0.0361 0.4904 -0.0634 0.5134 0.1049 0.1343 0.0587 0.3094 0.0656 0.2351 0.0039 0.9343 0.1119 0.0351
NEWEP                              -0.0055 0.9116 0.1008 0.1910 -0.1207 0.0665 -0.0188 0.5996 -0.0227 0.5155 -0.0397 0.4781 -0.0495 0.2387
T                              0.0030 0.0984 -0.0042 0.3873 0.0009 0.6207 0.0020 0.8750 -0.0001 0.9637 0.0000 0.9930 -0.0009 0.6410
CREDITRIGHT                              0.0009 0.9694 0.0435 0.1967 0.0334 0.0716 -0.0111 0.7876 0.0011 0.9602 0.0115 0.7254 -0.0251 0.3228
SHARERIGHT                              -0.0269 0.1895 0.0069 0.8496 -0.0527 0.0145 -0.0112 0.7708 -0.0139 0.2814 -0.0470 0.0337 -0.0029 0.8756
D(GDPR)                              0.0131 0.0567 0.0157 0.0118 0.0092 0.2990 0.0032 0.6586 -0.0009 0.9374 0.0049 0.4625 -0.0196 0.0825
D(GDPR(-1))                              -0.0149 0.0124 -0.0272 0.0027 -0.0150 0.0349 -0.0119 0.0125 -0.0066 0.2556 -0.0046 0.4661 -0.0130 0.1634
TREND                              -0.0368 0.0000 -0.0362 0.0001 -0.0318 0.0000 -0.0211 0.0005 -0.0237 0.0001 -0.0203 0.0003 -0.0189 0.0447
R-squared                 0.6385 0.5844 0.5231 0.4872 0.6502 0.5297 0.6459
Durbin-Watson                 2.5589 2.0336 2.5566 1.7538 1.7003 2.4882 1.8662
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                ISCED1 ISCED2 ISCED1 ISCED2
INVEARLY                    0.0514 0.2569 0.2753 0.0000 VC -0.0324 0.0367 0.0627 0.0004
INVEARLY(-1)                    0.2464 0.0224 0.0955 0.2113 VC(-1) 0.1425 0.0063 0.0095 0.7199
INVEARLY(-2)                    0.0887 0.5666 -0.5236 0.0001 VC(-2) 0.1056 0.0133 -0.0804 0.0000
INVEARLY(-3)                    -0.4332 0.1034 -0.5188 0.0000 VC(-3) 0.0061 0.8843 -0.0427 0.0775
INVEARLY(-4)                    0.3134 0.0861 0.4758 0.0001 VC(-4) -0.0569 0.2491 -0.0969 0.0041
INVEARLY(-5)                    0.5600 0.0431 -1.8253 0.0000 VC(-5) -0.0084 0.9092 -0.2098 0.0006
INVEARLY(-6)                    -0.0005 0.9991 2.0023 0.0000 VC(-6) 0.1206 0.1769 0.2736 0.0601
INVEARLY(-7)                    -0.0019 0.9949 -0.9516 0.0001 VC(-7) -0.1018 0.0545 0.1184 0.5992
C                    0.3579 0.2313 0.3876 0.7466 C 0.6233 0.0053 0.1582 0.9274
RR1                    -0.0023 0.1958 0.0042 0.6537 RR1 -0.0022 0.1135 -0.0004 0.9702
RR25                    -0.0016 0.5139 0.0007 0.9472 RR25 -0.0019 0.3782 0.0020 0.9063
RRATE                    0.0023 0.4190 -0.0009 0.9667 RRATE 0.0011 0.5366 0.0036 0.9061
BENEFIT                    -0.0492 0.1161 -0.0776 0.3171 BENEFIT -0.0297 0.2080 -0.0537 0.0058
UNCORD                    -0.0167 0.8067 -0.1471 0.4501 UNCORD 0.0132 0.7020 -0.0528 0.1741
NEWEP                    0.0839 0.0067 0.1374 0.4325 NEWEP 0.0748 0.0215 0.1288 0.5138
T                    -0.0024 0.6641 -0.0064 0.0053 T -0.0046 0.3091 -0.0042 0.0012
CREDITRIGHT                    0.0780 0.0187 0.0598 0.0005 CREDITRIGHT 0.0448 0.1343 -0.0164 0.9184
SHARERIGHT                    -0.0168 0.3419 -0.0194 0.8078 SHARERIGHT -0.0270 0.0899 -0.0004 0.9959
D(GDPR)                    0.0140 0.0179 0.0131 0.0258 D(GDPR) 0.0164 0.0447 0.0137 0.3681
D(GDPR(-1))                    -0.0119 0.0023 -0.0037 0.4498 D(GDPR(-1)) -0.0081 0.0607 -0.0162 0.0853
TREND                    -0.0450 0.0005 -0.0064 0.7948 TREND -0.0521 0.0000 -0.0165 0.2798
R-squared              0.6714 0.5885 R-squared 0.7217 0.6205
Durbin-Watson                 2.1641 2.4754   Durbin-Watson 2.2205 2.5164
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